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ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SYMPOSIUM
RESTORING AMERICANS' PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
By Joel R. Reidenbergt
ABSTRACT
In the United States today, substance abusers have greater privacy
than web users and privacy has become the critical issue for the devel-
opment of electronic commerce. Yet, the U.S. government's privacy
policy relies on industry self-regulation rather than legal rights. This arti-
cle argues that the theory of self-regulation has normative flaws and that
public experience shows the failure of industry to implement fair infor-
mation practices. Together the flawed theory and data scandals demon-
strate the sophistry of U.S. policy. The article then examines the compre-
hensive legal rights approach to data protection that has been adopted by
governments around the world, most notably in the European Union, but
finds that difficulties implementing these laws for online services pose
important challenges for the effective protection of citizens' privacy. The
lessons show that safeguarding citizens' rights requires a combination of
law and technology and that a legal incentive structure is necessary to
stimulate the rapid development and implementation of privacy-
protecting technologies. The article concludes with a recommendation
for a framework privacy law in the United States modeled on the
O.E.C.D. guidelines that includes a safe harbor provision for policies and
technologies and that creates a U.S. Information Privacy Commission to
assure the balance between citizens' privacy, industry needs, and global
competitiveness.
Privacy is a critical issue for the growth of electronic commerce. Dur-
ing the last few years, an overwhelming majority of Americans report that
they have lost control of their personal information and that current laws
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are not strong enough to protect their privacy.' In 1998, Business Week
found that consumer worries about protecting privacy on the Internet
ranked as "the top reason people are staying off the Web above cost, ease
of use and annoying marketing messages."2 The fair treatment of personal
information and citizen confidence are each necessary conditions for elec-
tronic commerce over the next decade. Yet, sadly, at the political birth of
the electronic commerce movement in 1997, the White House's report, A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, 3 more commonly referred to
as the Magaziner Report, missed a key opportunity to assure the protection
of citizens' privacy on the Internet.
For years, the United States has relied on narrow, ad hoc legal rights
enacted in response to particular scandals involving abusive information
practices.4 The approach has led to incoherence and significant gaps in the
protection of citizens' privacy. 5 For example, substance abusers have
stronger privacy rights than web users in the United States. 6 Yet, rather
than revise American privacy protection, the Magaziner Report adopted a
position enshrining the status quo.
This paper will first examine the philosophy and sophistry behind the
U.S. policy of industry self-regulation. Next, the paper examines the com-
1. Privacy Exchange.org, 1998 Privacy Concerns & Consumer Choice Survey,
Executive Summary, at 1 (last modified Dec. 15, 1998)
<http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/surveys/1298execsum.html> (reporting that 82% of
those surveyed feel that consumers have lost all control over how companies collect and
use their personal information); Am. Ass'n. of Retired Persons, AARP Members' Con-
cerns about Information Privacy, Dec. 1998 (reporting that 78% of those polled found
existing statutory protections inadequate to protect privacy).
2. BW/Harris Poll: Online Insecurity, BUS. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 102
<http://www.businessweek.com/1998/11/b3569107.htm>.
3. WILLIAM J. CLINTON & ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997), available at <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomml
ecomm.htm> [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
4. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A
STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 10 (1996).
5. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997);
SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW, supra note 4.
6. Federal law carefully protects the personal information of individuals who un-
dergo treatment for alcohol or drug abuse in programs receiving federal funds or subject
to federal regulation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-1, 290dd-2 (1994); SCHWARTZ & RE-
IDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW, supra note 4, at 177-78. At the same time, only limited
protection is available for Internet users. Statutory protection applies to telecommunica-
tions transaction information when collected by telecommunications service providers.
See 47 U.S.C. § 222. However, if the data is collected by web sites, instead of service
providers, then the statutory protection does not apply.
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prehensive legal rights approach to data protection that has been adopted
by governments elsewhere around the world, in a movement led by the
European Union. While conceptually the cross-sectoral approach is better
suited to the treatment of personal information in electronic commerce, the
foreign experience illustrates a number of challenges for effective protec-
tion of citizens. The concluding section argues for a more desirable policy
that combines legal and technological means in order to safeguard the pri-
vacy of citizens on the Internet.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY AND SOPHISTRY OF U.S. PRIVACY
POLICY
Broad, international consensus exists on the basic standards of fair in-
formation practice and the protection of citizen privacy in a democratic
society.7 As recently as June 1998, the Clinton Administration even said
that the "O.E.C.D. Guidelines have served as the basis for virtually all pri-
vacy legislation and codes of conduct that have been developed over the
years."' Beginning with the U.S. Department of Health and Education's
elaboration of the first computer privacy policy in 19739 and the United
States' approval of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and De-
velopment's privacy guidelines in 1980, the United States has recognized
benchmark norms for fair information practice. These norms include
specification of the purpose for data collection, the consent of individuals
to process personal information, the transparency of data processing, such
as notice to individuals and access to their personal information, special
7. See Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of individuals with regard
to automatic processing of personal data, Jan. 28, 1981, EUR. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in
20 I.L.M. 377 (1981), available at <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/108e.htm> [hereinaf-
ter European Convention]; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (Nov. 23,
1995), available at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/enlif/datlen_395LOO46.html> [herein-
after European Directive]; O.E.C.D., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF
PERSONAL DATA, O.E.C.D. Doc. C58 (final) (Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422
(1981), available at <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.htm> [herein-
after OECD Guidelines].
8. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (June 1998)
<http://www.doc.gov/ecommerce/privacy.htm>.
9. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, Records, Computers and the Rights
of Citizens (1973), reprinted in U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,
PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY, 15 n.7 (1977).
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treatment of particularly sensitive information, such as medical data, and
the existence of enforcement remedies and mechanisms.
The United States, however, has rejected all attempts to legislate any
full set of standards.' 0 Rather, Congress and state legislatures have enacted
isolated and narrow statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act" and
the Video Privacy Protection Act, 12 after the discovery of particularly
scandalous practices. This type of statutory protection only covers the
particular activities committed by specific actors such as a consumer credit
reporting agency or a video rental service provider. This reactive policy
for fair information practices has historically been predicated on the phi-
losophy that self-regulation will accomplish the most meaningful protec-
tion of privacy without intrusive government interference, and with the
greatest flexibility for dynamically developing technologies. The theory
holds that the marketplace will protect privacy because the fair treatment
of personal information is valuable to consumers; in other words, industry
will seek to protect personal information in order to gain consumer confi-
dence and maximize profits.
1 3
For more than twenty years, however, government agency task forces
and reports regularly illustrated the lack of fair information practices in
American society, but nevertheless resorted to the mantra that business
should be given more time to self-regulate.14 With the Internet revolution,
10. See Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Fail-
ure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFrWARE L.J. 199
(1993).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 3).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2710-2711 (1994).
13. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADM.,
PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, Ch. I.A (June 1997)
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/privacy-rpt.htm>.
14. See, e.g., U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY
IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS (June 1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm>;
INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION IN-
FRASTRUCTURE (Apr. 1997) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/privacy.htm>; FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Dec. 1996) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy/privacyl.htm>; NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADM., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
PRIVACY AND THE NIL: SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL
INFORMATION (Oct. 1995) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html>;
U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, COMMON
GROUND: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE (Mar. 1995) ; U.S. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE WORKING
[Vol. 14:771
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the Clinton Administration had a chance to conceive a new vision of
American privacy. Unfortunately for American citizens, the Magaziner
Report sought to preserve the status quo:
The Administration considers data protection critically impor-
tant. We believe that private efforts of industry working in coop-
eration with consumer groups are preferable to government
regulation, but if effective privacy protection cannot be provided
in this way, we will reevaluate this policy. 15
In effect, the Magaziner Report catered to the industry of personal data
rather than enshrining citizen participation in decisions about their per-
sonal data. Indeed, the marketplace of personal information is big business
in the United States. By 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies
selling personal information and profiles, largely without the knowledge
or consent of the individuals concerned, was reportedly $1.5 billion.' 6
Despite the claims of industry partisans, there are critical normative
flaws in the theory of self-regulation for information practices. Self-
regulation assumes that all privacy values can and should be resolved by a
marketplace. Yet privacy interests are central to democratic governance17
and privacy has been hailed as a necessary condition for participatory
governance. 18 In contrast, totalitarian governments prefer the surveillance
state. 19 Indeed, a democratic government typically does not sell basic po-
litical rights. But even if one rejects this position, a marketplace can only
function efficiently if there is transparency; citizens must be able to iden-
tify the collectors and users of their personal information. However, for
personal information, the natural tendency of the marketplace is to obscure
its treatment.
This is a classic case of market failure. Without disclosure by corpora-
tions, citizens cannot ascertain how their personal information is acquired
and used. In the private sector, the economics are wrong for transpar-
GROUP ON PRIVACY, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION (Oct. 1995)
<http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/ipc/ipc-pubs/niiprivprin-final.html>.
15. FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 14 (Issue 5).
16. See In re Trans Union, FTC Docket No. 9255, at 53 (July 31, 1998)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/d9255pub.id.pdf>.
17. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-26 (1967).
18. See Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REv. 553 (1995); Spiros Simitis, Re-
viewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 732 (1987).
19. See WESTIN, supra note 17, at 23.
1999]
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ency. Companies make significant profits from the secret collection and
sale of personal information; the $1.5 billion market in personal informa-
tion is largely hidden from public view. Few individuals have ever heard
of companies such as Acxiom or First Data. Yet, these companies have
data warehouses with the most intimate details of the lives of millions of
Americans. For example, Acxiom even sells information such as ethnic
and religious affiliations, the type of car a person drives, and whether a
person buys specialty clothing like particular types of underwear." With-
out transparency, an information trafficking industry has emerged in the
United States with no accountability and minimal risk of harm to corpo-
rate financial interests from abuses of personal information. Not surpris-
ingly, an analysis of industry codes of privacy practice reveals policies
that fail to address the most basic principles of citizens' rights to personal
information.
22
In effect, the American experience during the last two decades shows
that the theory of self-regulation is pure sophistry. Time and again, the
U.S. government has acknowledged that self-regulation remains hypo-
thetical in corporate America. The Department of Commerce held a long
awaited Public Meeting on Internet Privacy in June 1998, initially de-
signed to give industry a chance to show its self-regulatory successes.23
Unfortunately, industry had very little to show in terms of concrete im-
plementation of privacy practices and the Secretary of Commerce
conceded that the business community was failing to demonstrate effec-
tive self-regulation. 24 The Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, in
testimony to Congress during the summer of 1998, stated that "despite the
Commission's considerable efforts to encourage and facilitate an effective
20. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1193, 1248 (1998) (observing that transaction costs are ignored in the market-based
solutions); Paul Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Informa-
tion, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1997).
21. See Acxiom Catalog, at 9 (ethnic data), 11 (specialty apparel data), 12-13 (car
data) (1999) <http://www.acxiom.com/infobase/catalog/catalog99.pdf> (PDF file).
22. See Joel R. Reidenberg & Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Perspectives on Privacy, in
INFORMATION PRIVACY: LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (Mary Culnan & Robert
Bies eds., forthcoming 1999) (noting particular failure of industry codes to encompass
significant amounts of personal information and the failure to include remedies for vic-
tims of information abuse).
23. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, Agenda for Public Meeting on Internet Privacy
(June 23-24, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privacy/confinfo/agenda.htm>.
24. See Commerce Secretary William H. Daley, Remarks to Privacy Summit (June
23, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.doc.gov/opa/Speeches/980623.html>).
[Vol. 14:771
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self-regulatory system, we have not yet seen one emerge. '25 Several
months later, the first government review of the position paper A Frame-
work for Global Electronic Commerce wistfully admits that industry has
only tentatively responded to privacy concerns even in the face of heavy
government pressure.
26
It is worthy to note, however, that industry has improved its privacy
talk over the last few years. Trade associations are now addressing the is-
sues of data privacy (and lobbying Congress against regulation). The Sec-
retary of Commerce has also tried to highlight self-regulatory initiatives
such as TRUSTe and BBBOnLine as evidence of progress.
27
But, ironically, these examples themselves demonstrate the structural
defects in self-regulatory theory. TRUSTe, for example, is a program
through which websites agree to disclose their privacy policies and license
the right to use a special logo designating the site as one that protects pri-
vacy.2s TRUSTe may audit licensees to verify compliance with the stated
privacy policy. However, the program has had a few major problems. Al-
though about 450 companies are licensed to use the logo to date, this
number is trivial compared to the number of website operators in the
United States. In fact, one of the companies, GeoCities, holds the distinc-
tion of being the first company prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion for information trafficking,29 and fifty percent of the TRUSTe spon-
sors do not bother to subscribe to the program and license the logo. 30
TRUSTe even features a link on its web page to a look-up service site that
25. Electronic Commerce: Privacy in Cyberspace, Hearings on H.R. 2368 Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 105 Cong., 2nd Sess., July 21, 1998 (testimony of Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman of the FTC), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9807/
privac98.htm#N_3_>.
26. U.S. GOv'T WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. COMMERCE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 16
(Nov. 1998), available at <http://www.doc.gov/ecommerce/E-comm.pdf>.
27. See Commerce Secretary William H. Daley, Remarks at Press Conference on E-
Commerce (Feb. 5, 1999) (transcript available at <http://www.doc.gov/opa/Speeches/
ecommerceremarks.html>).
28. See TRUSTe, TRUSTe Program Principles (visited Mar.30, 1999)
<http://www.truste.org/webpublishers/pub-principles.html>.
29. See In re GeoCities Decision and Order, F.T.C. Docket No. C-3850 (visited
Mar.29, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015d&o.htm>.
30. As of March 2, 1999, TRUSTe had 51 sponsors; only 26 were registered as li-
censees of the TRUSTe logo to show a commitment to privacy. Compare TRUSTe,
TRUSTe Sponsors (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.truste.org/about/
aboutsponsors.html>, with TRUSTe, Look Up A Company (visited Mar.30, 1999)
<http://www.truste.org/users/users-lookup.html>.
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fails to disclose its privacy policy and is owned by a company that is not
even listed as a TRUSTe licensee.
3
'
A similar pattern exists at BBBOnLine, a project of the Better Busi-
ness Bureau proposed more than a year ago in response to U.S. govern-
ment pressure on industry to demonstrate that self-regulation might
work. 32 BBBOnLine hopes to provide an enforcement mechanism for pri-
vacy disputes online. However, for the moment, the BBBOnLine mecha-
nism remains hypothetical. While the program officially launched on
March 17, 1999, 33 BBBOnLine ignores the issue that consent might not be
an appropriate basis for the processing of some personal information, such
as health data, only requires that websites disclose particular practices,
fails to require that remedies be afforded to victims of information abuse,
and fails to require that individuals be granted complete access to their
personal information. 34 In addition, BBBOnLine uses a nebulous and un-
defined term, "individually identifiable information," to circumscribe the
scope of its participants' obligations. It also remains to be seen whether
the online industry will participate on significant scale.
Another important privacy initiative likewise remains unavailable even
after three years of development and government encouragement. Internet
labeling and filtering technology based on the world wide web's protocol,
Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS,") has been under devel-
opment for a privacy application, the Platform for Privacy Preferences
31. TRUSTe requires that "web sites ... must disclose their personal information
collection and privacy practices." TRUSTe, The TRUSTe Program: How it Protects Your
Privacy (visited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.truste.org/users/usershow.html>. However,
from the main TRUSTe member directory web page, TRUSTe, Member Directory (vis-
ited Mar. 30, 1999) <http://www.truste.com>, there is a link to
<http://www.worldpages.com/whitepages>. This latter site allows a user to search for the
address and phone number of anyone in the United States. The site does not display a
TRUSTe logo, nor does it disclose any privacy policy. There is a link in fine print at the
bottom of the web page About Worldpages to another web page:
<http://www.worldpages.com/docs/about.whtml> (visited Mar. 30, 1999). This last web
page similarly says nothing about privacy, but does identify the owner of the page: Web
YP, Inc. Web YP, Inc. is not listed as a licensee of TRUSTe, though a company identi-
fied as "World Pages, Inc." is listed.
32. See BBBOnLine, Homepage (visited Mar. 31, 1999)
<http://www.bbbonline.com>.
33. See Robert O'Harrow, Better Business Bureaus Offer Online Privacy Seal,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1999, at El.
34. See BBBOnLine, Eligibility Criteria for BBBOnLine Privacy Seal (visited Mar.
31, 1999) <http://www.bbbonline.com/businesses/privacy/eligibility.html>.
[Vol. 14:771
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("P3P"), since 1996. 3" The World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") 36, an
influential standards setting body for the Internet, has led the development
effort for P3P technology. Yet after three years, W3C has still not obtained
sufficient industry agreement to conclude the development phase, let alone
find companies willing to implement the technology. In addition, P3P
faces a patent licensing problem that jeopardizes its ultimate adoption by
industry.
37
The cornerstone of these self-regulatory efforts and U.S. policy seems
to be the concept that notice and consent will solve the privacy issues. In
describing the notice principle, the Magaziner Report articulates that
"[d]lata-gatherers should inform consumers what information they are col-
lecting, and how they intend to use such data." 38 The report describes the
consent standard by asserting that "[d]ata gatherers should provide con-
sumers with a meaningful way to limit use and re-use of personal infor-
mation." 39 The Magaziner Report even argues that "principles of fair in-
formation practice [] rest on the fundamental precepts of awareness and
choice. 4 0 This position is also emphasized clearly in the U.S. Department
of Commerce's Elements of Effective Self-Regulation.41 Yet, these pro-
nouncements seriously misconstrue basic fair information practices prin-
ciples. These basic principles include key standards, such as purpose
limitations, data minimization, and duration of storage that are not satis-
fied merely through notice and consent; notice and consent are not
enough. The United States has even recognized this broader range of is-
sues when it endorsed the O.E.C.D. Guidelines.42 In the rare instance
when a government agency, the Federal Communications Commission,
35. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON
CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, F.T.C. PROJECT
P954807, at 79-90 (June 4, 1996) (statement of Paul Resnick, AT&T Research)
(transcript available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf>).
36. See W3C, About the World Wide Web Consortium (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://www.w3.org/Consortiumn>.
37. See Chris Oakes, Patent May Threaten E-Privacy, WIRED, Nov. 11, 1998, avail-
able at <http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/16180.html>; Intermind,
About Intermind Communication's Patents (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://www.intermind.com/materials/patent-desc.html>.
38. FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 12 (Issue 5).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, N.T.I.A., ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE SELF-
REGULATION FOR PROTECTION OF PRIVACY (Jan. 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports
Elements /privacydraft/198dftprin.htm>.
42. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; Gellman, supra note 10, at 200.
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gave considered analysis to the effectiveness of consent as a legitimate
basis for the sale of personal information to marketers, the FCC found opt-
out to be a deficient basis for processing personal information under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that mandated the protection of sub-
scriber privacy.43
Thus, to rely principally on notice and consent ignores the other basic
fair information practice principles and underlines how self-regulation has
not worked. Indeed, for the online world, technological defaults routinely
favor privacy invasions over the implementation of fair information prac-
tices for citizens. Recent examples, such as the incorporation by Intel of an
embedded identifier on each of its Pentium III chips 44 and the "smart
browsing" features of Netscape Communicator and Internet Explorer
software that upload from the user's computer a hidden file containing the
Internet addresses of sites visited by the user, 45 illustrate techniques that
facilitate the surreptitious surveillance of citizens. These examples demon-
strate that the full range of fair information practice principles are margi-
nalized by self-regulation defined in terms of notice and consent. Smart
browsing, for instance, confronts the basic principle of purpose limitations
and storage duration as addresses, processed to make website connections,
are stored beyond the duration of the connection and now uploaded to a
remote site for profiling purposes.
These basic flaws in the theory and practice of the U.S. self-regulatory
approach pose an increasingly troubling problem for companies develop-
ing electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is global, yet American
privacy policy is at odds with the growing movement around the world to
establish clear, comprehensive legal rights. Ironically, American compa-
nies' global electronic commerce activities face an heretical choice: either
provide better protection for U.S. citizens in order to have a single set of
practices for global operations (because foreign laws require fair informa-
tion practices) or maintain a double standard, treating foreign citizens to
better privacy than U.S. citizens. The Magaziner Report largely ignores
43. See FCC Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC Docket No. 96-149, 91 (Feb. 19, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
CommonCarrier/Orders/1998/fcc98027.txt>.
44. See Jeri Clausing, After Intel Chip's Debut, Critics Step Up Attack, N.Y. TIES
ON THE WEB (Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/02/cyber/articles/
19intel.html>.
45. See Netscape Corp., What's Related FAQ (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://home.netscape.com/escapes/related/faq.html#o6>.
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this incongruity in boldly assuming that the rest of the world would simply
accept the U.S. status quo with better educational efforts.46
The international consequence of this self-regulatory pretense is an
embarrassment for the U.S. government. Without demonstrable privacy
protection in the United States, Europe threatens to block the flow of per-
sonal information to the United States.47 The U.S. Department of Com-
merce has sought to negotiate with the European Commission a "safe har-
bor" code that would assure privacy for international data transfers to the
United States and avoid any European data export prohibitions. 48 The pro-
posal met with resounding criticism and virtual ridicule for its lack of
content.49 Because the Department of Commerce cannot propose any
meaningful privacy standards, such as implementation mechanisms or en-
forcement devices providing remedies to victims, without undermining
support for self-regulation, it is unequipped to respond to such criticism.
Yet, without meaningful privacy standards, the United States isolates itself
from the rest of the world. The time has come to reevaluate and reverse
the policy that enshrines electronic surveillance and information traffick-
ing against citizens.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL
STANDARDS
The recycling of unsuccessful and outdated privacy policies in the
United States is in direct contrast to the data protection movement around
46. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, at 14 (Issue 5) ("The United States will continue
policy discussions ... to increase understanding about the U.S. approach to privacy and to
assure that the criteria [Europeans] use for evaluating adequacy are sufficiently flexible to
accommodate our approach.").
47. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 25.
48. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy Princi-
ples (Nov. 4, 1998) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/menu.htm>.
49. See International Trade Administration, U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, Public Com-
ments filed on "Draft International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles"
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/com.htm>; Working Party of European Data Protection
Supervisory Authorities, Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of data protection in the
United States and the ongoing discussion between the European Commission and the
United States Government, DG XV 5092/98/WP15 (Jan. 26, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/
commldgl5/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wpl 5en.htm>; Working Party of European Data
Protection Supervisory Authorities, Transfers of personal data to third countries: Apply-
ing Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive, DG XV D/5025/98/WPI2
(July 24, 1998) <http://europa.ue.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/
wp12en.htm>.
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the world. Foreign countries, led by the fifteen states of the European Un-
ion (the "Member States"),50 more typically follow an omnibus or com-
prehensive approach. Ironically, Europe learned its post-war lessons about
information privacy from the movement in the United States during the
1960s and 1970s. 51 But, unlike the United States, as European countries
faced the computer processing of large quantities of personal information
in the 1970s and 1980s, they adopted comprehensive data protection stat-
utes to enshrine a rights-based, rather than market-based, approach to pri-
vacy. Indeed, in 1981, the Council of Europe opened for signature and
ratification a data privacy treaty that has as its object and purpose "to se-
cure in the territory of each Party for every individual, whatever his na-
tionality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and
in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of
personal data."
52
Under the European model, framework legislation guarantees a broad
set of rights to assure the fair treatment of personal information and the
protection of citizens. In general, the modem European data protection
laws define each citizen's basic legal right to "information self-
determination. " 53 This European premise of self-determination puts the
citizen in control of the collection and use of personal information. The
approach imposes responsibilities on data processors in connection with
the acquisition, storage, use, and disclosure of personal information and, at
the same time, accords citizens the right to consent to the processing of
their personal information and the right to access stored personal data and
have errors corrected. Rather than accord pre-eminence to business inter-
50. These states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom.
51. See, e.g., COLIN BENNETr, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992); DAvID FLAHERTY,
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989); Fred H. Cate, The EU Data
Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest 80 IOWA L. REV. 431
(1995).
52. European Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1.
53. This term "information self-determination" was coined by a 1983 German court
decision prohibiting the intrusiveness of a national census. See Judgment of the First Sen-
ate [Bverfge, Karlsruhe], Dec. 15, 1983, translated in 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 94 (1984).
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ests, the European approach seeks to provide for a high level of protection
for citizens.
54
Although the comprehensive rights approach has conceptual appeal for
electronic commerce, it poses normative challenges for the structure of
electronic commerce ventures and the effective protection of citizens. Be-
cause the rights-based approach relies on omnibus legislation, it covers the
electronic processing of personal information regardless of context.55
These statutes apply the same standards of fair treatment for personal in-
formation across sectoral boundaries of collection and use. In theory, this
cross-sectoral application of principle correlates well to an information
society where industry boundaries blur and data use defies clear categori-
zation.
However, with the proliferation of European data protection laws dur-
ing the course of the last two decades, the national laws evolved 56 and dif-
ferent standards in various Member States threatened the flow of personal
information within Europe. For example, the scope of application of data
protection laws and transparency requirements varied across national laws,
posing conflicts for pan-European data processing. 57 In response, the
Member States of the European Union sought to harmonize data protec-
tion principles and launched a five-year negotiating process that ultimately
resulted in the enactment of the European Directive on data protection.
58
The European Directive confirmed the pre-existing comprehensive
rights-based approach and contained both general and exacting rules ag-
gregated from the laws of various European Union Member States.5 9 Like
the existing national laws, the European Directive's rules address the full
set of internationally recognized principles. Each Member State must en-
act legislation implementing standards conforming to those defined by the
54. See, e.g., European Directive, supra note 7, at Recital 10 (explaining that the
purpose of the Directive is to "seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Commu-
nity").
55. See id., at Recital 12, art. 3.
56. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Generational Development of Data Protection
in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 220 (Philip E. Agre &
Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998).
57. See European Directive, supra note 7, at Recital 7; JOEL R. RELDENBERG &
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES: REGULATORY
RESPONSES (Eur. Comm. 1998), available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/
dataprot/studies/regul.pdf>.
58. See European Directive, supra note 7.
59. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Pro-
tection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995).
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European Directive, and each Member State must maintain an independ-
ent, national supervisory authority for oversight and enforcement of these
privacy protections. 6 1 Significantly, the European Directive also mandates
that Member State law require any person processing personal information
to notify the supervisory authority and the supervisory authority must keep
a public register of data processors.
62
While the harmonization of European data protection around compre-
hensive standards seems conceptually better suited to electronic com-
merce, in practice, the complexity of data processing arrangements in an
information society makes the application of general principles to par-
ticular contexts challenging. Indeed, the registration mechanisms designed
to assure transparency of processing activities can become onerous and
problematic. Within Europe, critics have argued that compliance with
these registration obligations is lacking. 63 Elsewhere, required notification
to a government agency of data collection might be seen as an overly in-
trusive government action. In the United States, for example, the European
commitment to the registration of data processing activities with a gov-
ernment agency would clash with Fourth Amendment values against gov-
ernment intrusion into the activities of citizens.
Furthermore, the application of the European Directive does not re-
move all divergences and ambiguities in the European national laws.
64
Small divergences and ambiguity will inevitably exist where the principles
must be interpreted by different supervisory organizations in each of the
Member States. These remaining divergences in standards can pose sig-
nificant obstacles for the complex information processing arrangements
typical in electronic commerce. For example, the European Directive re-
quires that privacy rights attach to information about any "identifiable per-
60. This 'transposition' of the European Directive's standards into national law was
to have occurred by October 1998. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 32.
However, as is not uncommon in the European system, few Member States have com-
plied with the deadline.
61. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 28.
62. See id. at art. 18-19.
63. See Existing case-law on compliance with data protection laws and principles in
the Member States of the European Union, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the
Working Party Established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC (Douwe Korff ed., Eur.
Comm: 1998).
64. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 57; PETER
SwIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BusiNEss: WORLD DATA FLOWs, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DEcTcvE 188-96 (1998).
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son."65 Yet, the scope of this definition is not the same across the Member
States; what some Member States consider "identifiable" others do not.
66
Similarly, the disclosures that must be made to individuals prior to data
collection vary within Europe. 67 These differences distort the ability and
desirability of performing processing operations in various Member States
since potentially conflicting requirements might apply to cross-border
processing of personal information.
The effect of this challenge to comprehensive standards is, however,
mitigated by consensus building options and extra-legal policy instruments
that are available under the European model. The European Directive cre-
ates a working party of the Member States' data protection commission-
ers.6 8 The Working Party offers a formal channel for data protection offi-
cials to consult each other and to reach consensus on critical interpretive
questions. But, policy guidelines from the Working Party will not be suffi-
cient to assure privacy in electronic commerce. Guidelines will not be
meaningful in a dynamic network environment without a technical infra-
structure that also promotes data protection. This has been recognized in-
ternationally by data privacy commissioners: "it is mandatory to develop
design principles for information and communications technology ..
which will enable the individual user to control ... his personal data."
69
Interestingly, the European model includes a provision for consensus on
industry codes of conduct that might prove quite useful to facilitate the
implementation of privacy compatible technologies. 70 The European Di-
rective, building on Dutch law, provides for approval of codes of conduct
as conforming to the privacy standards. This provision can be used to cer-
tify technical codes and configurations to assure privacy.71 The use of such
technical measures may also be designed to avoid problems found in stan-
dards divergence, such as the differences in notice requirements.
72
65. European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 2(a).
66. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 57, at 124-
26.
67. See id. at 133-34.
68. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 29.
69. International Working Group on Data Protection and Telecommunications, Data
Protection and Privacy on the Internet: Report and Guidance (Berlin, Nov. 18, 1996)
<http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/diskus/13_15.htm>.
70. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 27.
71. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 57, at 147.
72. See id. at 153-54; Working Party of European Data Protection Supervisory
Authorities, Opinion 1/98: Plaform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profil-
ing Standard (OPS), DG XV D/5032/98/WP11 (June 16, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/
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For global information networks and electronic commerce, the com-
prehensive approach also inevitably invokes tension. Without the statutory
authority to restrict transborder data flows, the balance of citizens' rights
in Europe could easily be compromised by the circumvention of Europe
for processing activities. Consequently, the European Directive includes
two provisions to assure that personal information of European origin will
be treated with European standards. The choice of law clause in the Euro-
pean Directive assures that the standards of the local state applies to ac-
tivities within its jurisdiction and the transborder data flow provision pro-
hibits the transfer of personal information to countries that do not have
"adequate" privacy protection.73 Some commentators have predicted that
any European action will spark a trade war that Europe might lose before
the new World Trade Organization.74 While, in theory, such a situation is
possible, it is equally remote.
75
Even with the difficulties of the European approach, countries else-
where are looking at the European Directive as the basic model for infor-
mation privacy, and significant legislative movements toward European-
style data protection exist in Canada, South America, and Eastern
Europe.76 This movement can be attributed partly to the pressure from
Europe arising from scrutiny of the adequacy of foreign privacy rights, but
is also partly due to the conceptual appeal of a comprehensive set of data
comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wpllen.htm>; Joel R. Reidenberg, International
Data Flows and Methods to Strengthen International Co-operation (paper presented at
the 20th International Conference of Data Protection Authorities, Santiago de Compos-
tela, Spain) (Sept. 17, 1998) <http://home.sprynet.com/-reidenberg/idt.htm>.
73. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 4 (choice of law) and art. 25 (ex-
port prohibition).
74. See SWiRE & LITAN, supra note 64, at 188-96.
75. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Movement toward Obligatory Standards for Fair
Information Practices in the United States, in VISIONS FOR PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES
FOR THE DIGITAL AGE (Colin Bennet & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999).
76. See, e.g., HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC, THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF THE PAR-
LIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
68-72 (1998) (discussing the influence of the European Directive for Hungarian data
protection law); Council of Europe, Chart of Signatories and Ratifications (visited Apr.
20, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/108t.htm> (listing countries that have ratified the
treaty on data privacy); Industry Canada, Task Force on Electronic Commerce: The In-
ternational Evolution of Data Protection (Oct. 1, 1998) <http://e-com.ic.gc.ca/english/
fastfacts/43dl0.htm> (justifying the Canadian proposal for a comprehensive privacy law
by reference to the European initiative); Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal
Data, Hong Kong, Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, Ch. 486 (visited Apr. 20, 1999)
<http://www.pco.org.hk/ord/section_00.html> (displaying Hong Kong statute that fol-
lows the European comprehensive model).
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protection standards. In effect, Europe has displaced the United States in
setting the global privacy agenda with the enactment of the data privacy
directive.
But, as illustrated by the European experience, the resolution of these
difficulties cannot derive from law reform alone. In short, the comprehen-
sive standards approach has two serious problems. First, general princi-
ples, while needed, leave significant margin for implementation and inter-
pretation, especially in countries with very different legal cultures. For
electronic commerce, any ostensibly small divergences in implementation
or interpretation can generate significant distortions affecting the coverage
for personal information and the incentives for protection by companies.77
Second, the process to enact data protection law in Europe shows that
adoption of legal rights is exceedingly slow. The existing European data
protection directive took five years and transposition into national law was
scheduled for three additional years. 78 In Internet time, these delays are
generational.
III. SAFEGUARDING CITIZENS' RIGHTS WITH A
COMBINATION OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
The lessons from the American experience with self-regulation show
that government cannot abdicate responsibility for the protection of citi-
zens' privacy to a marketplace skewed in favor of sale of personal infor-
mation. At the same time, the lessons from the European experience
involving detailed comprehensive statutes illustrate that effective privacy
does not end with a legislative enactment. The guarantee of privacy for
citizens requires a combination of law and technology that affords mecha-
nisms to assure the fair treatment of personal information.
In a democratic state, privacy is and remains a basic right of citizens.
79
In contrast to many other aspects of privacy, informational privacy is
unique in that citizens cannot determine how their personal information is
being used without access to internal activities of those processing the
data. To paraphrase Justice Stewart, "I do not know it when I cannot see
77. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 57, at 142-
46.
78. See European Directive, supra note 7, at art. 32.
79. See Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989); OECD
Guidelines, supra note 7, at Preamble ("Member countries have a common interest in
protecting privacy and individual liberties."); Schwartz supra note 18; Simitis, supra note
18; WESTIN, supra note 17.
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it.' ' 8° As a consequence, the citizen confidence in the treatment of personal
information that is so necessary for robust electronic commerce will not
develop without a clear underlying set of rights.
To restore privacy for American citizens, the United States needs a
framework that provides consistent fair information practices across dif-
ferent types of uses of personal information and different forms of proc-
essing arrangements. The United States government, however, need not
try to reinvent fair information practice principles. The O.E.C.D. guide-
lines offer a full set of standards already recognized by the United States.
81
The content of these guidelines provides a clear basis and level playing
field for citizen privacy, and the guidelines themselves have been praised
as sensitive to business concerns. These principles should be adopted in
law as the American framework for information privacy.
Nevertheless, as both the American and European experiences show,
technological capabilities and configurations hold the balance between
effective fair treatment of personal information and defective privacy.
Technical choices embed a set of policy rules for information flows in data
processing systems. This "code" 83 or "lex informatica ' ' 84 contained in the
technical infrastructure has a direct rule-making effect on privacy. For ex-
80. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (describing attempts to categorize
pornographic materials as "I know it when I see it.").
81. See O.E.C.D. Guidelines, supra note 7; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRIVACY
AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (June 1998) <http:/www.doc.gov/ecommercel
privacy.htm> (recognizing the OECD Principles as the standard); U.S. Dept. of Comm.,
Nat'l Telecomm. and Info. Adm., The Global Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Cooperation, 60 Fed. Reg. 10359, 10367 (Feb. 24, 1995) (recognizing that the US ac-
cepts the OECD Principles).
82. After the O.E.C.D. adopted the guidelines, major U.S. companies subscribed to
the principles. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY POLICY ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION AGENCY (Aug. 31, 1984) cited in
Gellman, supra note 10, at 227 n.60; H.P. Gassman, Vers un cadre juridique internation-
ale pour 1'informatique et autres nouvelles techniques de l'information, ANNUAIRE
FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 747, 750 (1985) (according to the author, who was
a staff official at the O.E.C.D., 180 U.S. companies had subscribed to the O.E.C.D.
guidelines).
83. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L. J.
869, 898 (1996).
84. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule Making in Cyberspace,
45 EMORY L. J. 911, 917-19, 929 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The For-
mulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998)
[hereinafter Lex Informatica].
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ample, the protocol P3P 85 is designed to empower web users by giving
them information about website privacy policies and affording web users
choices in the provision of personal information. However, P3P can only
be effective if fairly written and appropriately implemented. The technical
way in which the P3P protocol allows the expression of privacy policies
and the choices given to web users are value-based decisions. 6 Further-
more, the manner in which P3P is incorporated in browsers, including the
default settings and the fashion by which websites actually describe their
practices, are critical for fair treatment of personal information. The de-
velopment of "cookies" and their ability to track users across the Internet
is another example of policy rules embedded in technical standards. 87 The
initial default settings built into browsers encouraged the secret transfer of
user's information, and only when faced with scandal did the software de-
velopers increase users' control over the disclosure of information.
88
These cases show that the technology can "go either way." The availabil-
ity of privacy-protective technologies and privacy-enhancing default set-
tings must exist. Yet, industry has demonstrated its lethargy in developing
and implementing these technologies. Already, P3P has been in the devel-
opment stage for three years and wide-spread use of the standard is, at
best, a long time away.
Government must, therefore, act in a fashion that assures technological
development in a direction favoring privacy protections rather than pri-
vacy intrusions. During the debate over self-regulation, U.S. industry took
privacy more seriously only when government threats of regulation were
perceived as credible. For example, the threats and cajoling from the Fed-
eral Trade Commission was a key impetus for the development of the
BBBOnLine, Online Privacy Alliance, and TRUSTe programs. But, de-
spite deadline extensions for action by the Federal Trade Commission,
none of these programs has yet to demonstrate accountability by their cor-
85. P3P is a protocol to enable disclosure and negotiation of the terms of consumer
privacy between a web user and a web site collecting personal information. See W3C,
Platform for Privacy Preferences P3P Project (visited Mar. 31, 1999)
<http://www.w3.org/P3P>.
86. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Use of Technology to Assure Internet Privacy
Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, LEX ELECTRONICA (Fall 1997)
<http://www.lex-electronica.org/reidenbe.html>.
87. See Mark Slayton, An Introduction to Cookies, HOT WIRED, Nov. 7, 1996
<http://www.hotwired.com/webmonkey/webmonkey/geektalk/96/45/index3a.html>.
88. See James Glave, Next Netscape Will Chew Cookies on Command, WIRED
NEWS, Feb. 22, 1997, available at <http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/
2196.html>.
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porate members for violations of privacy to individuals.89 Indeed, to the
contrary, industry created policies tend toward privacy myopia in the de-
velopment of new products. Intel, for example, seemed genuinely sur-
prised by the outrage expressed against its planned use of an unique identi-
fier on its Pentium III chips.
90
With the enactment of a basic set of rights, the incentive structure for
industry would shift to the development of effective protection for citizen
privacy rather than the elaboration of vague policies to forestall corporate
accountability. The existence of basic legal rights will force industry to
deploy fair information practices that are well-balanced rather than
skewed against citizens. To stimulate the quick development of privacy
protecting system designs, these legal rights should allocate liability to
companies that fail to develop and deploy privacy-enhancing technol-
ogy. In doing this, legal standards will create new markets and opportu-
nities for the development of privacy protecting products.
In any case, the promotion of privacy-friendly technologies and the
implementation of fair information practices in particular contexts and es-
pecially in the electronic commerce context require constant vigilance.
While counterintuitive for many in the United States, a U.S. Information
Privacy Commission is urgently needed. Privacy policy requires a forum
with a clear mandate for independent judgment to build consensus on so-
lutions in particular contexts and to arbitrate disputes among stakeholders.
In addition, U.S. business interests need an advocate in the face of inter-
national data flows. For years, the United States has remained on the side-
lines of the annual meeting of data protection commissioners from around
the world because the United States has no privacy commission.
At present, no existing agency or department in the United States is
well suited to the tripartite role of consensus builder, privacy arbitrator,
and international advocate. The Department of Commerce, where interna-
tional privacy policy is presently formed, may be politically expedient, but
is inappropriate for the range of privacy issues in the Information Society.
The Commerce Department does not, for example, have particular exper-
tise or competence in health privacy issues or global flows of employee
data and is notoriously captured by business interests at the expense of
89. None of the programs offers any damage remedy to individuals when the com-
pany adherents fail to fulfill their privacy commitments.
90. See Polly Sprenger, Intel on Privacy: 'Whoops!', WIRED NEWs, Jan. 25, 1999
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/17513.html>.
91. See Lex Informatica, supra note 86, at 584 (discussing the effect of liability and
the structure of the Internet.).
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citizens' concerns. 92 The State Department might be more appropriate for
the foreign policy role, but has no expertise on the myriad of domestic pri-
vacy issues. Similarly, existing independent agencies such as the Federal
Communications Commission would be poor choices for the centralization
of privacy policy. The competence of these existing agencies is sectoral
and each lacks expertise in cross-sectoral issues. The recent creation of a
new position in the White House Office of Management and Budget is a
good, but insufficient step.93 Unfortunately, the new position is placed
within the layers of the OMB bureaucracy and does not fulfill all the
needed roles. Instead, the post has a coordinating role and does not have
policy decision-making authority nor does the position have authority for
the international negotiations with Europe.
If the United States hopes to protect effectively citizen privacy in
electronic commerce, an independent privacy commission offers a number
of attractive benefits both for citizens and businesses. The application of
general privacy principles in the dynamic and complex online environ-
ment will inevitably require interpretation of the standards. Since a citi-
zen's perspective may undervalue the interests of industry and society at
large to information flows, while a corporate perspective will undervalue
citizen's privacy, an independent privacy commission can offer critical
guidance. In particular, such a commission can be accorded the authority
to grant safe harbor protections for company practices. 94 Like a no-action
letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission, a company seeking
guidance and assurance that its policies are appropriate should be able to
request approval from the privacy commission. Such an approval would
mean that the practice conforms to the legal obligations for the fair treat-
92. For example, instead of publishing notice in the Federal Register for public
comment on the draft international privacy principles, Undersecretary Aaron sent a letter,
dated November 4, 1998, addressed "Dear Industry Representative" and posted it on a
hidden web page several days later. See Letter from David Aaron, Undersecretary of
Commerce to Industry Representatives (Nov. 4, 1998), available at
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/aaron114.html>.
93. Declan McCullagh & James Glave, Clinton Tabs Privacy Point Man, WIRED
NEWS, Mar. 3, 1999, available at <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/
18249.html>.
94. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in an Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 242 (1992) (proposing a legis-
lative model with a safe harbor mechanism for industry).
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 791 1999
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ment of personal information. This safe harbor approach was recently en-
dorsed by the Federal Trade Commission.
95
In the context of electronic commerce, the safe harbor concept is espe-
cially powerful for guidance on technical infrastructure decisions. Techni-
cal protocols, default settings, and implementations can be treated the
same way as company practices and policies for purposes of a safe har-
bor.96 The existence of such a voluntary approval mechanism would give
companies an important tool to avoid myopic, internal evaluations of the
privacy ramifications, protect against data scandals, insulate the company
from liability for privacy invasions, and satisfy foreign privacy regulators
such as those in the European Union.
At the same time, the safe harbor process would afford citizens an op-
portunity for public comment on the conformity of practices to framework
legal obligations and would not immunize practices outside the safe harbor
nor immunize those safe harbor practices that change. Over time, safe har-
bor decisions would develop a body of public guidance that would in-
crease transparency for all citizens. For citizens, the independent commis-
sion and a safe harbor procedure would also assure that the interpretation
of fair information practices for electronic commerce continues as an on-
going process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the U.S. government to become serious about
privacy and restore protection to citizens. The Magaziner Report clearly
erred in charting a conventional approach for a most unconventional, new
environment. Citizens participating in global electronic commerce need to
be assured that their personal information will be treated fairly. Compa-
nies engaged in electronic commerce cannot be crippled in their use of
personal information. Fundamental values are at stake and one-sided poli-
cies and solutions will undermine democratic society.
95. See Electronic Commerce: Privacy in Cyberspace, Hearings on H.R. 2368
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 21, 1998 (testimony of Robert
Pitofsky, Chairman of the FTC), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9807/
privac98.htm#N_3_>.
96. See, e.g., REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW, supra note 57, at
153-54.
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